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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DOROTHY BLACK,
Plaintiff-Appellant
Case No. 14724
-vsBRIEF OF RESPONDENT
ROBERT L. MCKNIGHT,
Defendant-Respondent

NATURE OF THE CASE
This litigation arises out of an automobile accident
occurring on March 5, 1970 on U, S. Highway 91, Davis County,
Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Jury trial was held on June 2 to June 4, 1976 inclusive,
resulting in a verdict of No Cause for Action.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant has recited facts based almost entirely on her
own testimony and completely ignores the testimony of the Defendant, as well as the Highway Patrol officer, who was an eye-witness
to the accident.
We therefore recite the facts.
The Defendant had completed his shift at Hill Air Force
Base at approximately midnight March 5, 1970, and was driving his
car alone south to his home in Salt Lake City*

Traffic was light

and after rounding a curve in the highway, he noticed the taillights of the Plaintiff's vehicle in the outside lane, some considerable
distance ahead. He also noticed that a car was stopped
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
^ „

*-U^

<r,~~.»-

~T

Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1 J

...til.

-

.

-

-

-

He noticed that he was gaining on the car ahead and therefore
moved into the

inside

lane when he was approximately 8/10ths

of a mile from where the stopped car was (T-62)a

His speed was

about 60 to 65, and the speed limit was 70 m.p.h. (T-62).
When he was approximately 300 to 400 yards away he recognized the stopped car as a Highway
flasher signals were not on.

Patrol car, but its red

He continued on, overtaking the

vehicle in the right lane, and when he was in a position, with
the front of his car near the rear of the Plaintiff's vehicle
(T-62), the Plaintiff's car suddenly swerved in front of him.
There was no signal of any kind, either blinker or hand signal
(T-62-63).
The Defendant swerved to his left and applied brakes
but the impact immediately occurred wherein the right front of
the Defendant's vehicle struck the left rear of the Plaintiff's
vehicle (T-63).
Officer Spadevechia had previously been driving south on
the highway when he saw 2 horses standing in the emergency lane
(T-23).

He stopped and backed up to them, putting on his rear

flasher lights, but he did not turn on his overhead revolving red
lights, as he did not want to "spook11 the horses (T-29).
ped approximately 3 to 5 feet south of the 2 horses (T-32).

He stopThe

horses remained standing in the emergency lane while he radioed
for assistance (T-32).
He had seen the lights of the Plaintiff's vehicle approaching.

The horses never got on either of the travel lanes (T-32).

As he turned to face forward, he states that the Plaintiff's veDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
OCR, may contain
errors. approximately where the
hicle made a turnMachine-generated
to the inside
lane,

horses were (T-33) and immediately thereafter an accident occurred
shortly ahead of the police vehicle.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
41-6-62 (a) IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THIS
CASE. AND THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED INSTRUCTIONS BASED THEREON.
There was absolutely no evidence, from any witness, that
the Defendant was nfollowing,f the Plaintiff, by which term, of
course, has reference to following cars, which are directly behind cars ahead and in the same lane, in which situation the
following car must keep a reasonable distance between the vehicles *
Facts of the case at bar have to do with two vehicles,
each in a different lane, with the rear vehicle overtaking and
intending to pass the slower moving vehicle.
The Statute certainly has nothing to do with a fact situation, as here, where the jury had overwhelming evidence that
established that the Plaintiff, without a signal of any kind,
suddenly swerved from her outside lane to the inside lane,
directly into the path of the Defendant, whose car was so close,
that an accident immediately happened.
Fairbourn v. Lloyd (1968) 21 Ut.2d 62, 440 P.2d 257 discusses the above Statute in a factual situation where, in fact, the
Defendant was following the Plaintiff's car, when a collision occurred as a result of Defendant's failure to see the Plaintiff
stop, due to slush on the windshield.
Even in that case, the Supreme Court held it was a jury
question as to whether Defendant was negligent, and a verdict for
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Defendant was upheld.

Appellant's Requested Instructions on the cited statute,
therefore, were clearly erroneous as applying the law as it
applies to entirely different facts than were present here.
The Honorable Trial Court was clearly correct in its
ruling denying the requests.
POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION 12 FULLY COVERED THE
LANGUAGE OF 41-6-46 (1)0
The Court's Instruction No.

12 to the jury advised them

that it was the Defendant's duty (a) to keep a proper lookout;
(b) to keep his vehicle under reasonably safe control; (c) to
drive at such a speed as was reasonable and prudent under the circumstances;

(d) to sound a horn if circumstances required it.

Appellant complains that a jury should have been further
instructed that ffin every event" motorists are required to drive
at such a speed that accidents will be avoided.
Again, Appellant is citing cases in her Brief which embody entirely different factual situations than the facts of the
case at bar.
In Dalley v. Midwestern Dairy Products, 80 Ut. 331,
15 P02d 309 (1932) a truck was parked encroaching upon the travel
portion of the highway, and of course, this Court upheld the doctrine that motorists must drive, in the nighttime, at such a speed
that they can stop or avoid objects on the highway ahead which are
illuminated by the headlights.
In O'Brien v0 Alston, 61 Ut. 368, 213 P0 791 (1923), and
the case cited therein in Appellant's Brief, again was based on
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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his headlights to see the Plaintiff's vehicle*, He had seen her
taillights when he was practically a mile away. After he moved
into the inside lane and was then in the process of overtaking
and intending to pass the Plaintiff, on Plaintiff's left, with no
obstacles or vehicles ahead, the holdings in the Dalley and O'Brien
cases simply are inapplicable,,
We do not have, here, a case where the Defendant failed to
see an object, or obstruction in the highway ahead.

He, in fact,

saw everything that was there to be seen, excepting the presence
of the horses on the shoulder of the road, but even had he seen
the horses, standing on the shoulder of the road, and not obstructing either lane of travel, as testified to by the Highway Patrol
officer, he would have been justified in continuing on, as he did.
There is nothing in the law that requires a passing motorist to stop "on a dimef!, when the driver of the car being passed
suddenly and unexpectedly swerves into his lane at a time when it
is impossible for the passing motorist to stop, swerve, or otherwise avoid an accident0
POINT THREE
THE JURY VERDICT, CONSIDERED IN THE LIGHT FAVORABLE
TO THE DEFENDANT, SHOULD BE AFFIRMED,
This Honorable Court, in a myriad of cases, has repeatedly
announced that the jury verdict will be upheld where justified by
the evidence considered in a light most favorable to the prevailing party.

For example:

Utah 1964. Supreme Court was required to view evidence
in light most favorable to the verdict winner.—Taylor
v. Johnson, 393 P«2d 382, 15 Utah 2d 343, appeal after
remand 414 P.2d 575, 18 Utah 2d 16.
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Utah 1964. Evidence and all reasonable inferences that
could be drawn therefrom were to be VIPWPH in ^ i o-ht- mnst-

favorable to jury's findings,--Gordon v3 Provo City,
391 P02d 430, 15 Utah 2d 287.
When trial court has given approval to determination by jury by refusing to grant new trial,
judgment should be looked upon with some degree of
verity, presumption is in favor of its validity,
and burden is upon appellant to show some persuasive
reason for upsetting it.--Id,
Utah 1963, Facts must be viewed in light most favorable to party who prevails below.--Ortega v. Thomas,

383 P.2d 406, 14 Utah 2d 296.
Utah 1963. On appeal of defendant, evidence must be
viewed in light most favorable to plaintiff*—Powers
v, Taylor, 379 P.2d 380, 14 Utah 2d 152.
The investigating officer, who was also an eye-witness,
testified directly contrary to the testimony of the Plaintiff.
He also substantiated the version of the accident testified to by
the Defendant,
The Plaintiff's version that the horses were walking on
the travel portion of the highway was refuted by both the officer
and the Defendant.

The Plaintiff's statement that she signaled

before changing lanes was refuted both by the Defendant and the
investigating officer.

In addition, the Plaintiff admitted she

had never seen the lights of the Defendant's vehicle before she
changed lanes, but quite surprisingly, saw the lights immediately
before the impact.

She never looked in her outside rear-view

mirror before making the lane changea
Indeed the evidence of the Plaintiff's contributory negligence was, in fact, overwhelming, and the verdict of the jury
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
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